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HISTORY COMES CALLING: DEAN 
GRISWOLD OFFERS NEW EVIDENCE 
ABOUT THE JURISDICTIONAL 
DEBATE SURROUNDING THE 
ENACTMENT OF THE DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT ACT 
Donald L. Doernberg* 
Michael B. Mushlin** 
In a recent article,' we proposed that the Declaratory Judg- 
ment Act of 19342 was intended, contrary to the Supreme Court's 
long-standing interpretati~n,~ to enlarge the subject matter jurisdic- 
tion of the federal courts. When Congress considered the Act,4 ju- 
risdictional concerns centered around whether declaratory 
judgments would violate the case-or-controversy c l a ~ s e , ~  not 
whether introduction of the device would expand the federal ques- 
tion jurisdiction Congress already had a~thorized.~ There is, in- 
- - 
* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Yale University; J.D. 1969, Co- 
lumbia University. 
** Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 
1970, Northwestern University. 
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Dean Erwin N. Griswold for his 
generosity in sharing his recollections and insights with them, and for permitting his 
contribution to this difficult area to be published. 
1. Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act 
Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Fedeml Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court 
Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529 (1989). 
2. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
$0 2201-02 (1982 & Supp. 1985)). 
3. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
4. The Act was before Congress from 1919 to 1934. The chronology of its adop- 
tion is discussed extensively in Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 1, at 547-73. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 2, cl. 1. 
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). 
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deed, substantial evidence that Congress intended to expand federal 
question jurisdiction to include at least two, and possibly three, case 
models;' there is virtually no evidence supporting the contrary posi- 
tion taken by the Supreme Court in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro- 
leum Co. and subsequent cases.9 We concluded that a complaint 
seeking declaratory relief ought to be evaluated for jurisdictional 
purposes on its face,1° under the same rules as complaints seeking 
coercive relief. Certainly nothing in the history of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act suggests that a complaint seeking declaratory relief 
should be denied federal adjudication merely because the court 
would have lacked jurisdiction if the complaint instead had sought 
coercive relief. We therefore argued that the jurisdictional analysis 
prescribed by the Court in Skelly Oil should be abandoned, and that 
the Declaratory Judgment Act should be recognized as having cre- 
ated a cause of action and expanded federal question jurisdiction. 
Dean Erwin N. Griswoldl sent the following letter in response 
to our article.12 It is reprinted with his permission. Our reply 
follows. 
The February, 1989, issue of the UCLA Law Review came 
across my desk the other day, and I was much interested in see- 
- p- p- - - 
7. The three case models are discussed in their historical context in Doernberg & 
Mushlin, supra note 1, at 548, 562-73. In brief, the three models are: 
(1) a "mirror-image" case, in which the party seeking the declaratory 
judgment would have been the defendant in a traditional federal-question 
coercive action but has not yet been sued; (2) a "federal-defense" case, in 
which the defendant asserts a federal defense to the plaintiff's nonfederal 
coercive action; and (3) a "federal-reply" case, in which both the com- 
plaint and answer would include only state claims but where the plain- 
tiff's reply would raise a federal issue. 
Id. at 548 (footnotes omitted). 
8. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). The Court in Skelly Oil stated that Congress intended the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to be "procedural only," merely "enlarg[ing] the range of 
remedies available in the federal courts . . . ." Id.!at 671. On that premise, the Court 
prescribed the analytical method still used today for declaratory judgment cases, in 
which the jurisdictional inquiry is directed toward evaluating a hypothetical coercive 
complaint corresponding to the declaratory judgment complaint that was actually filed. 
See Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 1, at 544. 
9. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 
1 (1983). 
10. Skelly Oil prescribed hypothetically redrafting declaratory judgment com- 
plaints as if they had sought coercive relief instead, and then evaluating the nonexistent 
coercive complaint under the tests for federal question jurisdiction. See Doernberg & 
Mushlin, supra note 1, at 544. 
11. Dean of Hanard Law School, 19461967; Solicitor General of the United 
States, 1967-73. Dean Griswold is currently a member of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue 
in Washington, D.C. 
12. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Donald L. Doernberg and Michael B. 
Mushlin (Mar. 3, 1989). 
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ing your article on the Declaratory Judgment Act. I have read it 
with much interest, and it has brought back many memories, 
since I was, in a remote sense, "present at the creation." 
To explain this, I will set out a sort of long footnote to your 
article. 
My third year as a student at the Harvard Law School was 
1927-28. During that year, I took Professor Frankfurter's course 
on Federal Jurisdiction. It was a lively course, and there was 
much discussion of many problems. That was the year of Liberty 
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927), and Liberty Ware- 
house Co. v. Burley, 276 U.S. 71 (1928), shortly followed by Will- 
ing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274 (1928). All 
of these cases were the subject of extensive discussion in Profes- 
sor Frankfurter's class. 
One of my clear memories is that Professor Frankfurter was 
much concerned about "case or controversy." We dealt at 
length with the Muskrat l 3  case and other matters, and the de- 
claratory judgment problem was discussed largely in terms of 
case or controversy. There was no doubt of two things-first, 
that Professor Frankfurter was opposed to federal jurisdiction in 
declaratory judgment cases, and, second, that much of his oppo- 
sition stemmed directly from his close relationship to Justice 
Brandeis. 
There was, I think, substantial reason for the concern of 
Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter, particularly in the 
atmosphere of the times when courts, including the Supreme 
Court, were very free and easy in the. matter of holding statutes 
unconstitutional. Specifically, the opposition of Justice Brandeis 
was largely based on his experience with the "Advisory Opinion" 
practice in Massachusetts, under which the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts gives opinions on the constitutional va- 
liditv of a statute before it is enacted into law. Because of Advi- 
sory Opinions, many constructive changes in the law in 
Massachusetts had been stopped in their tracks, without any op- 
portunity for practical experience. 
Under the Advisory Opinion system, the constitutionality of 
a proposed statute is considered in vacuo. There is no actual 
case.  here are no facts. There is no individual who has been 
hurt, or is being protected. There is a tendency for the court 
(and counsel in their argument) to hunt out the worst possible 
factual assumption, and to conclude that the statute, as drawn, 
would be invoked in such a case, leading to the result that the 
statute should be declared unconstitutional. 
Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter felt that such a 
question should be considered by a court only in a concrete case, 
based on actual facts. Then, it might be possible, in a trial, to 
present the factual background, to show what the statute would 
13. [EDITOR'S NOTE] Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
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do to this particular plaintiff, and to present facts and arguments 
which would support the constitutionality of the statute as ap- 
plied to those facts. 
This is, I think, a real concern. A sort of reverse application 
of it can be found in the case of PenneN v. City of Sun Jose, 108 S. 
Ct. 849 (1988), recently decided by the Supreme Court. There, 
there was an attack on the validity of an ordinance of the city of 
San Jose. The effort to get a decision that the ordinance violated 
the due process clause was unsuccessful because there was not 
really a; actual case. There were no specific facts. There was 
nothing to indicate that anyone had actually been harmed, or 
even that any specific person would be harmed. There were, in- 
deed, indications that on an actual record, with facts, there might 
be a question about the validity of the ordinance. (This includes 
not only clear and specific provisions of the ordinance or statute, 
but also questions of the practical or administrative construction 
of it. In other words, even if the statute or ordinance is subject to 
an interpretation which might make it unconstitutional, that 
question need not be faced if there is clear administrative or prac- 
tical construction of the statute, keeping it within the bounds of 
constitutionality. (I am enclosing a copy of a page from a Re- 
view article which illustrates the point.))14 
Perhaps I am unduly influenced by my first encounter with 
this problem, more than sixty years ago. I do think, though, that 
there is room to limit the "mirror image" application of declara- 
tory judgments, at least as far as questions of constitutionality 
are concerned, so that the question of constitutionality will only 
be considered on the actual facts of a real case. 
Dean Griswold's letter tends to confirm our historical conclu- 
sion'* that opposition to the declaratory judgment device arose pri- 
14. [EDITOR'S NOTE] The relevant portion of the page reads as follows: 
In Pennell v. City of Sun Jose, [I08 S. Ct. 849 (1988)l the Court 
generally approved the concept of governmental regulation of rental mar- 
kets. But there is an interesting invitation contained within the first few 
paragraphs of the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
The case arose in a context, according to the Chief Justice, "without any 
showing in a particular case as to the consequences [of the regulation's 
application, and] does not present a sufficiently concrete factual setting 
for the adjudication of the takings claim the appellants raise here." 
Johnson, Rent Control and the Theory of Eficient Regulation: Introduction: Is the 
Supreme Court Ready for the Question, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 729, 739 (1988) (foot- 
notes omitted). 
PenneN sought a declaration in the California courts that the new San Jose ordi- 
nance violated the takings clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. The Court found that the controversy was insufficiently developed to 
permit adjudication of the claim of violation of the takings clause, 108 S. Ct. at 856-57, 
but it did affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court rejecting plaintiff's due 
process and equal protection claims on the merits. 
15. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 1, at 554-73. 
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marily because of case-or-controversy concerns, not Gecause of any 
inherent problem in expanding federal question jurisdiction within 
the confines of the case-or-controversy clause. We are sensitive to 
the problem of opinions being rendered in the absence of a genuine 
case or controversy. Indeed, we did not mean to suggest either that 
we think courts ought so to act or that Congress, in finally enacting 
the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934, suggested abandoning that 
constitutional principle of judicial restraint to which justices Bran- 
deis and Frankfurter so strongly adhered. Certainly we found no 
evidence to suggest that Congress intended to establish a declara- 
tory judgment system analogous to the Massachusetts Advisory 
Opinion system to which Dean Griswold refers.16 We do think, 
however, that the declaratory judgment device can encompass 
many cases presenting concrete disputes appropriate for judicial 
resolution. l7 
To be sure, some actions seek declaratory judgments in circum- 
stances where dismissal on case-or-controversy grounds is appropri- 
ate,'8 but that is true of cases seeking coercive relief as we11.19 We 
merely think that each case must be examined individually to deter- 
mine whether it presents, as the Court said in a different context, 
"that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is- 
sues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional que~tions."~~ Thus, in many cases, like 
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation T r ~ s t , ~ '  a 
16. Congress was aware of and hoped to avoid the problems of that system. Id. at 
566-68. 
17. As Professor Wright has noted, "The critical question in'each case is whether 
the facts averred under the existing circumstances present a real controversy between 
parties having adverse legal interests of such immediacy and reality as to warrant a 
declaratory judgment." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 671 (4th ed. 1983) 
(footnote omitted). Jurisdictional problems aside, the Supreme Court seems to have 
had no difficulty in distinguishing declaratory judgment cases that do present justiciable 
cases or controversies from those that do not. Compare Lake Carriers Ass'n. v. Mac- 
Mullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972) and Alvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943) and Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) with Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. 
Ct. 849 (1988) and Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) and Eccles v. People's 
Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948). 
18. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969). 
19. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Socialist Labor Party v. 
Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972). 
20. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The Baker Court, of course, was 
speaking of standing rather than case or controversy, but we think the Court's senti- 
ment is transferable in this instance. 
21. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). Franchise Tax Board is discussed extensively in Doernberg 
& Mushlin, supra note 1, at 544-47, 578-82. 
Heinonline - -  37 UCLA L. Rev. 143 1989-1990 
144 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:139 
declaratory judgment, action does present a concrete case and 
should be adjudicated. 
Dean Griswold's recollection of then-Professor Frankfurter's 
reservations about the potential case-or-controversy problems of de- 
claratory judgments is especially important in light of Justice 
Frankfurter's authorship of the Court's opinion in SkelIy Oi1.22 By 
the time Skelly Oil was written, Justice Frankfurter's views of the 
constitutional problems of declaratory judgments and the jurisdic- 
tional concerns that flowed from those problems apparently had 
changed from what they were when he taught Dean Griswold's 
Federal Jurisdiction class. We respectfully submit that Professor 
Frankfurter's understanding of jurisdictional concerns about the de- 
claratory judgment device was more accurate and better supported 
by history than was Justice Frankfurter's. 
22. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
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